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Coping with Cognitive Limitations: 
Problems of Rationality in a Complex World 
Nicholas Rescher 
Synopsis 
( 1) In cognitive and practical contexts alike, euen the most rational of problem-solutions can 
misfire in situations of incomplete inf onnatian. For in all rational deliberation the conclusion 
must be a function of the premisses. The prevailing state of our information will - and should 
- decisively aff e·ct the determination of what is the best thing to do or to think. In consequence 
any changes in or additions to the available information can -and shoul.d - affect our issue­
Tesolucions. And here future changes are presently unforeseeable. (2) We must act on the basis 
of what our conscientious cognitfoe efforts can here and now prooide, recognizing that our 
available information in highly complex matters is generally less than adequate - let alone 
complete. Accordingly, in the inf ornunively problematic setting of a complex world, reason faces 
the predicament of acknowledging that it must call on us to do that which, for aught we know, 
may in the end prove totally inappropriate. 
1. Stage .. Setting for the Problem: Issue Resolution Hinges on Available Information 
Science is an inherently dynamical venture; the theories and thesis of one scientific 
era will -and because of technological progress must-differ from those of another. And 
the wishes and preferences of scientists notwithstanding, the world-picture that they 
deliver into our hands becomes increasingly complex over time. The history of science 
is a story of the ever-renewed realization that things were not so simple as they seemed. 
What does this increasing complexity of our understanding of the world's ways portend? 
The answer has some rather ominous consequences - not just for matters of belief but 
for matters of practice as well. 
Rational action encounters serious challenges in a complex world. For in such a world 
the information at the disposal of limited beings is bound to be incomplete, and in 
situations of imperfect information their very rationality can lead rational agents into 
difficulty. This becomes apparent with even the most simple of problem-solving 
situations. For consider such cases as the following: 
Case 1 :  Informational gap-filling 
DAT A: A manuscript note contains the (partly illegible) passage: 'He sent her a l�tter .. .'. 
QUESTION: How is that gap in 'l-tter' to be filled in? 
Case 2: Probabilistic reasoning 
DATA: 1. X is a mechanical engineer. 
2. 90 per cent of mechanical engineers are male. 
QUESTION: How probable· is it that X is male? 
Case 3: Inductive inference 
DAT A: A sequence starts 1 ,  10, 100. 
QUESTION: What are we to expect at the 10th place? 
Case 4: Prudential decision 
DAT A: 1.  It is starting to rain. 
2. Yonder large tree affords the only shelter in the large, flat meadow 
that we are crossing. 
QUESTION: Where should we go? 
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Case 5: Expect intervention 
DAT A: 1. X suffers from asthma. 
2. Antihistamines are the most effective available medicament for (most 
cases of) asthma. 
PROBLEM: What course of action should we recommend to X? 
In each case, we face a perfectly possible and clearly delineated situation of choice. 
And in each instance the "rationally appropriate resolution" seems rather obvious and 
straightforward. But now consider what happens when some additional, supplementary 
information is added. Let us assume that in these five cases we acquire some further 
information: 
Case 1 :  The passage continues: "to transport her wounded brother". 
Case 2: We are also informed that X gave birth to a bouncing baby boy last week. 
Case 3: We are further told that the sequence continues 1,  10, 100, 11 10, 100, for the 
next six entries. 
Case 4: We are given the supplemental datum that there is also much lightning and 
thunder. 
Case 5: We are also informed that X is  highly allergic to antihistamines. 
Clearly, one and the same phenomenon recurs throughout. Infonnatively more amply 
grounded choices may or may not be better, but they will frequently be different. In all 
sorts of cases, the rational resolution of a problem is highly context,sensitive to the 
information in hand in such a way that what is a patently sensible and appropriate 
resolution in a given data,situation can cease to be so in the light of additional 
information - infonnation that does not abrogate or correct our prior data, but simply 
augments it. Often as not, additional ramifications complicate matters by destabilizing 
seemingly obvious resolutions. For exactly what qualifies as the most rational resolution 
of a particular problem of belief, action, or evaluation is bound to depend upon the 
precise content of our data about the circumstances. And this dependency so functions 
that a "mere addition" to our information can radically transform the situations as 
regards optimality. For, as those preceding examples indicate, a mere amplification of the 
known circumstances may well indicate the appropriateness of doing something totally 
incompatible with that initial optimum. The fact is that the rationally appropriate 
resolution of a problem on the basis of one body of evidence or experience can always 
become undone when that body of evidence or experience is not actually reuised but 
merely enlarged. 
It is just here that complexity makes for difficulties. Whenever we operate in complex 
situations we are constantly involved in learning new facts about them - facts which can 
aU too easily upset the applecart of our previous ideas. We thus confront the situation 
generated by the confluence of two considerations: that the rationality of a problem· 
resolution is "information-sensitive," and that amidst the complexities of the real world 
our information is always incomplete. 
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The rationally appropriate approach in any situation of problem solving - be it 
cognitive or practical - is to strive for the best resolution achievable in the light of the 
available data. Rationality enjoins us to adopt the optimal option: having surveyed the 
range of alternatives, the appropriate thing to do is to resolve the choice between them 
in what is, all considered, the overall most favorable way. What is "favorable" will of 
course differ in some ways from context to context. But the fact remains that rationality 
is a matter of optimization relative toccrutraints -of doing the best one can in the prevailing 
circumstances. Yet in complex settings, circumstances are bound to change in the light 
of fuller understanding. And it is a trite fact - which nevertheless has enormously far­
reaching implications - that the deployment of intelligence or incomplete information 
may well yield inadequate solutions. 
The history of the empirical sciences affords a familiar illustration. Beliefs in the 
luminiferous aether, the conservation of matter, and the like, were all sensible and 
rational in their day. Achieving a substantial enlargement of the data base on which we 
erect the structures of our theorizing generally produces those changes of mind 
characterized as "scientific revolutions." As significantly enhanced experimental 
information comes to hand, people are led to resolve their problems of optimal question­
resolution in radically different ways. 
In cognitive and practical contexts alike, even the most rational of problem-solutions 
can misfire in situations of incomplete information. For in all rational deliberation the 
conclusion is and must be a function of the premises. The prevailing state of our 
information will - and should - decisively affect the determination of what is the best 
thing to do or to think. And in consequence any changes in or additions to the available 
information can - and should - affect our issue-resolutions. 
We standardly operate on the presumption that the available information is adequate 
to permit the appropriate resolution of the problems we face. (After all, we have no 
option but to do the best we can with the means in hand.) But all too frequently this 
presumption turns out ultimately falsified. Yet twentieth-century medicine is naturally 
not deficient for failing to apply twenty-first-century remedies. Rationality, like politics, 
is an art of the possible - a matter of doing the best that is achieved in the overall 
circumstances in which the agent functions - cognitive circumstances included. Our 
best�available judgments- not only as to the actualities of things but also as regards their 
plausibilities and probabilities - will always be conditional judgments formed in the 
context and against the background of the then available information as best we can 
determine it. And in this sphere future changes are presently unforeseeable. 
It will not do to react to this state of affairs by saying: "Delay decision until your 
experience is perfected and your information altogether complete." To postpone a 
decision until then is tantamount to preventing its ever being made. A rationality we 
cannot deploy here and now, amidst the realities of an imperfect world, is altogether 
useless. 
Still, the situation that we face is an ironic one. Categorical (unconditional) rational 
appropriateness always hinges on the total circumstances, involving the entirety of 
relevant information, be it present and absent. But obviously this second factor of "absent 
information" poses difficulties. In this world, our circumstances are inevitably sub-ideal, 
our information unavoidably incomplete. The inconvenient fact is that here, as 
elsewhere, we simply cannot determine that nothing outside our cognitive reach has a 
certain character or tendency - that this is more than we can ever actually manage. 
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2. Ideal vs. Practical Rationality: The Predicament of Reason 
We have no better alternative but to act on the basis of what our conscientious cognitive 
efforts can here and now provide, recognizing that our available information in highly 
complex matters is generally less than adequate - let alone complete. Accordingly, in 
the informatively problematic setting of a complex world, reason faces the predicament 
of acknowledging that it must call on us to do that which, for aught we know, may in the 
end prove totally inappropriate. 
The Predicament of Reason residing in the irresolvable tension between the demands 
of rationality and its practical possibilities comes to view in the following aporetic 
situation: 
(1) As agents who pretend to rationality, we ought to act as fully 
rational agents do, namely to· do what is in fact the rationally 
optimal thing. 
(2) We can do no more and no better than to opt for what appears 
to be the best option in the circumstances. 
(3) It cannot reasonably and rationally be asked of us to do more 
than the very best that is possible in the circumstances. 
( 4) What appears to be the best option in various circumstances may 
not actually be the best option. 
Since these theses are mutually incompatible, one of them must be sacrificed, and 
since (2) and (4} represent unavoidable "facts of life," and (3} seems unavoidable, it 
would seem that ( 1) must be abandoned in the interests of consistency .. restoration. Yet 
neither the rationality-abandonment of ( 1) 's rejection nor the unrealistic perfectionism 
of (3} 's rejection are attractive options. And the resulting situation is a thoroughly 
uncomfortable one - whence the characterization of a predicament. 
Fortunately, the difficulty that arises here admits of a sensible resolution. The 
dlistinction between idealized and practicable rationality offers a way out of the discomfort 
of a sacrifice of (1). For we must distinguish between: {i) IDEAL rationality, which is 
geared to those resolutions that are rationally appropriate with absolutely everything 
relevant taken into account - that are optimal pu:re and simple, and (ii) PRACTICAL 
rationality, which is geared to resolutions that are rationally appropriate with everything 
relevant taken into account that we can eff ectitJely manage to take account of in the 
prevailing circumstances - resolutions that are optimal as best we can manage to teU. This 
distinction softens the impact of rejecting that initial pivot-premiss of the predicament. 
For, while we cannot indeed achieve the impracticable demands of hyperbolic ideal, we 
clearly should do all we can in the direction of practicable rationality. 
The crux of the matter is that rationality is not a matter of absolute optimization but 
of circumstantial optimization, not of doing what is the unqualifiedly best thing but of 
doing the best that can be done in the circumstances - including the informational 
circumstances - that are at issue. Consider the following illustration: 
1. One has a severe headache. 
2. In actual fact, yonder tablet is a (perfectly harmless) aspitjn pill 
that will cure one's headache. 
3. One has every reason to believe that yonder tablet is a deadly 
poison. 
What is the rational thing to do? Clearly, it is to avoid taking the tablet. The 
irrationality of acting contrary to the indications of circumstantially manageable optimi­
zation is not redeemed by the unforeseeably favorable issue of events. 
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After all, ideal rational optimally is something merely "utopian" and "pie in the sky." 
For us, the only practicable optimally is that which is realistic and achievable - optimally 
as best we can get hold of it, which accordingly remains merely apparent optimally. All 
we can ever secure in real-life situations of rational deliberation are seeming optima 
arrived at in the light of incomplete information. We can have no assurance that they 
will continue to be optimal in the light of a fuller appreciation of the circumstances. We 
can only do our best. 
"But the problem is created by mere ignorance." True enough! But true in a way that 
provided no comfort. Imperfect information is an inevitable fact of life. A "rationality" 
that could not be implemented in these circumstances would be tot.ally pointless. Were 
rationality to hinge on complete information, it would thereby manifest its irrelevance 
for our concerns. There is nothing "mere" about ignorance regarding how matters 
actually stand in this complex world of ours. 
If we had "complete information," and in particular if we knew how future efforts 
would eventuate -how matters will actually turn out when we decide one way of another 
- then rational decision-making and planning would of course become something very 
different from what they are. But all we can ever do is to be rational in the circumstances 
as best we can determine them to be. If rationality were only possible in the light of complete 
information it would perforce become totally irrelevant for us: It lies in the inevitable 
nature of things that we must exercise our rationality amidst conditions of imperfect 
information. A mode of ''rationality" capable of implementation only in ideal circum, 
stances is pointless; in this world, the real world, there is no work for it to do. We have 
to be realistic in our understanding of rationality- recognizing that we must practice this 
virtue in real rather than ideal circumstances. In fact, to ask more of rationality would 
not itself be rational. A conception of rationality that asks no more of us than doing the 
best we possibly can is the only one that makes sense -anything else would be ipso facto 
irrelevant. Clearly, if rationality is to be something that one can actually implement, 
then it has to be something whose demands can be meet in sub-ideal conditions -
conditions of incomplete information as we (inevitably) confront them. 
This sort of situation obtains throughout all areas of rational deliberation: cognitive, 
prudential, evaluative - right across the board. Even our optimally evidentiated beliefs 
are not necessarily true; even out optimally well-advised actions are not necessarily 
successful; even our optimally crafted appraisals are not necessarily correct. The reality 
of limitation meets us in every direction. 
We are comparatively simple creatures living in a comparatively complex world; And 
for this reason we occupy a position in which a good deal of skepticism is warranted. Not 
that we do not know anything- or indeed a great many things - but in a complex world 
our knowledge is bound to be of a changing, dynamic, progressive character, so that our 
presently available knowledge is imperfect - at any and every present. Evolution has 
equipped us with an intellect adequate to fare satisfactorily (though certainly not 
perfectly) with the environment as we find it - sufficiently to cope effectively in the 
statistical average with the situations relating to our well being as regards survival and 
reproduction. All the same, our knowledge is bound to be frequently inadequate to the 
situation that actually confronts us. And the problems of praxis that result are 
formidable, since we know full well on general principles that the actions we deem 
appropriate on the basis of even the most careful exploration of incomplete information 
can readily turn out to be entirely ineffective and inappropriate. 
The most we can ever possibly do - and the most that can be asked of us in the name 
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of rationality - is to do the best we can manage to do under the prevailing conditions. 
And when one combines this with the consideration that we humans virtually always 
labor in circumstances of incomplete information we see that rationality is a resource of 
inherently limited utility. 
We simply have to come to terms with the predicament of reason: the circumstance that 
reason constantly calls on us, to do that which, for ought we know, may prove totally 
inappropriate. Rational action in this world has to proceed in the face of the sobering 
recognition that while we doubtless should do the best we can in the circumstances, this 
may nevertheless eventuate as quite the wrong thing. It is the course of reason ( 1) to aim 
at the absolutely best, but (2) to seule for the best that is realistically available. (After 
all, it would be unreasonable, nay irrational, to ask for more.) But the paradox lies in our 
clear recognition of the tension between the two. 
Reason's predicament inheres in the fact that while the ideal ends of rationality are 
achieved only tinder the ideal conditions of global totality, nevertheless the actual 
practice of rationality must inevitably be conducted at the level of local and imperfect 
conditions. We can never rest complacently confident that in following reason's 
directions we are not frustrating the very purposes for whose sake we are calling upon the 
guidance of reason. We have to recognize the "fact oflife" that it is rationally advisable 
to do the best we can, while nevertheless realizing all the while that it may prove to be 
inappropriate. Reason calls ,on us to act on the basis of the best information that our 
. conscientious efforts can here and now provide - notwithstanding the recognition that 
they may not in the end prove to be sufficient. 
Rationality is undoubtedly the best resource that we have, but there is no failproof 
assurance that in the conditions of incomplete information that obtain in a complex 
world its guidance will prove good enough. And yet while rationality is an imperfect 
resource, there is nowhere else where we can - rationally - go. Virtually by definition, 
the rationally appropriate ros.olution will, in the circumstances, afford out best choice. 
There thus stands before us the profound lesson of the biblical story of the Fall of Man, 
that in this complex world of ours there are simply no guarantees - not even for a life 
conducted on principles of reason. It is this sobering situation - doubtless unwelcome, 
but inevitable - that betokens the Predicament of Reason; the circumstance that 
rationality requires us to do "what seems best" in the full and clear recognition that this 
may well fail to be, in actuality anything like the best thing to do. 1 
Notes 
1 Some of the themes of th.is paper are also addressed in the author's Rationalit, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988). 
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